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This paper studies how ﬁrms reorganize following diversiﬁcation, proposing that ﬁrms use outsourcing, orvertical disintegration, to manage diseconomies of scope. We also consider the origins of scope diseconomies,
showing how different underlying mechanisms generate contrasting predictions about the link between within-
ﬁrm task heterogeneity and the incentive to outsource following diversiﬁcation. We test these propositions
using microdata on taxicab and limousine ﬂeets from the Economic Census. The results show that taxicab ﬁrms
outsource, by shifting the composition of their ﬂeets toward owner-operator drivers, when they diversify into the
limousine business. The magnitude of the shift toward driver ownership is larger in less urban markets, where
the tasks performed by taxicab and limousine drivers are more similar. These ﬁndings suggest that (1) ﬁrms
use outsourcing to manage diseconomies of scope at a particular point in the value chain and (2) interagent
conﬂicts can be an important source of scope diseconomies.
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1. Introduction
Why do ﬁrms become less efﬁcient as they increase
their scope of activities? Though scholars have pro-
posed many answers to this puzzle, there is little
empirical evidence on the origins of scope disec-
onomies. This paper develops a novel theoretical
framework wherein scope diseconomies link the hori-
zontal and vertical boundaries of the ﬁrm and use this
framework to guide an empirical analysis of outsourc-
ing, or vertical disintegration, in response to diver-
siﬁcation. Our main ﬁnding is that diseconomies of
scope cause diversifying ﬁrms to outsource formerly
integrated activities that are costly to govern within a
diversiﬁed enterprise.
By focusing on reorganization, this study departs
from an established literature on diversiﬁcation and
performance, which asks whether related expansion
outperforms conglomerate diversiﬁcation (Wernerfelt
and Montgomery 1988, Lang and Stulz 1994). Because
ﬁrm performance could be either a cause or a con-
sequence of diversiﬁcation, the prior literature has
produced a vigorous debate over selection effects
and whether diversiﬁcation is a managerial mistake
(Villalonga 2004). Instead of analyzing performance
effects, we study the link between diversiﬁcation and
organizational change—speciﬁcally outsourcing—to
learn about the underlying factors that link ﬁrm scope
to governance costs.
Our theoretical framework builds on Coase (1937)
and Williamson (1975) by assuming that ﬁrms out-
source, or vertically disintegrate, when the costs of
integration exceed the costs of using markets or long-
term contracts to govern a transaction. However, we
link outsourcing to diversiﬁcation by suggesting that
coordinating activities across multiple divisions can
increase the cost of governing a particular transaction
or activity within the ﬁrm. Our framework suggests
that ﬁrms will diversify and outsource when diversiﬁ-
cation creates net beneﬁts to the ﬁrm, but governance
costs associated with diversiﬁcation and vertical inte-
gration exceed the legacy transaction-cost beneﬁts of
vertical integration. Figure 1 depicts the overarching
logic: scope diseconomies are caused by transaction or
activity-level inefﬁciencies that lead ﬁrms to rethink
their vertical boundaries following diversiﬁcation.
We draw on three broad theories of corporate gov-
ernance to explain why internal governance costs
increase with ﬁrm scope. First, diversiﬁcation may
exacerbate monitoring costs that arise from cognitive
limitations (Penrose 1959, Schoar 2002) or incomplete
information (Holmstrom 1979). Second, diversiﬁca-
tion may increase inﬂuence costs, which arise when
divisions engage in wasteful rent-seeking competition
(Milgrom 1988, Rajan et al. 2000) or fail to coordi-
nate because of conﬂicting incentives (Bresnahan et al.
2009, Zhou 2010). Third, diversiﬁcation may increase
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Figure 1 Diversiﬁcation and Outsourcing
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social comparison costs when employees in a multi-
divisional ﬁrm perceive differences in the compen-
sation or promotion practices of a new division to
be unfair (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Nickerson and
Zenger 2008).
Our ﬁrst hypothesis predicts that when diver-
siﬁcation produces transaction or activity-level
diseconomies of scope, ﬁrms will respond by out-
sourcing. Outsourcing reduces monitoring, inﬂuence,
and envy costs by altering the nature of the sup-
ply relationship. Speciﬁcally, outsourcing relaxes
constraints on managerial attention by substituting
market incentives for direct monitoring. By shifting
decision rights to a new entity and allowing the mar-
ket to set prices, outsourcing replaces the inﬂuence
costs of bureaucratic rent-seeking with the arms-
length bargaining and renegotiation costs that attend
a contractual relationship. And by moving employees
outside the boundary of the ﬁrm, outsourcing limits
within-ﬁrm heterogeneity in incentives, abilities,
and rewards, thereby reducing envy and social
comparison costs.
Our second hypothesis predicts that the mediating
effect of task diversity (i.e., the variation in a ﬁrm’s
physical or intellectual production processes) on the
link between diversiﬁcation and outsourcing depends
on the underlying source of scope diseconomies. In
particular, we identify competing predictions that
emerge from two broad yet distinct theoretical mecha-
nisms, which we refer to as principal-agent and inter-
agent governance problems. Principal-agent problems
emphasize conﬂict between employees at different
levels in a formal hierarchy, whereas interagent the-
ories focus on conﬂict between peers. Thus, moni-
toring costs are primarily a principal-agent problem,
social comparison costs are primarily an interagent
problem, and inﬂuence cost models combine the two
mechanisms.
Principal-agent theories predict that the marginal
costs of diversiﬁcation are increasing in task diver-
sity, because it is harder to monitor and manage
more heterogeneous divisions. Conditional on diver-
siﬁcation, principal-agent theories predict more out-
sourcing as functional differences between formerly
independent lines of business increase. Interagent the-
ories generate the opposite prediction. For instance,
social comparison costs increase when agents in dif-
ferent divisions perform similar tasks but receive dif-
ferent incentives and rewards, leading to feelings of
envy (Kulik and Ambrose 1992, Festinger 1954). Thus,
conditional on diversiﬁcation, interagent theories pre-
dict less outsourcing as functional differences between
divisions increase. We test the competing predictions
of principal-agent and interagent theories by mea-
suring the relationship between diversiﬁcation and
outsourcing under conditions of high and low task
diversity.
Our empirical setting is the taxicab and limousine
industry.1 This industry is well suited to study diver-
siﬁcation, diseconomies of scope, and outsourcing for
several reasons. First, entry deregulation in the limou-
sine market led to a wave of diversiﬁcation during
the early 1990s. We use prederegulation variation in
1 We use the term “limousine” to describe vehicles that are often
called black cars, town cars, sedans, or executive limousines. These
vehicles are distinct from “prom” or stretch limousines. Because
we exploit variation across many distinct local markets, this paper
could also be thought of as a study of hundreds of similar taxicab
and limousine industries.
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local market conditions as an instrument for the post-
deregulation incentive to diversify. Second, vertical
integration, measured in terms of ﬂeet versus driver
ownership of taxicabs, exhibits considerable variation
both within and between ﬂeets. Although we cannot
measure governance costs directly in our setting, our
ﬁrm-level analysis uses a continuous dependent vari-
able of vertical integration, which allows us to mea-
sure outsourcing at an unusual level of detail. Third,
differences in local market size provide a meaningful
measure of task differentiation between taxicabs and
limousines. In particular, limousines are prohibited
from servicing the “street hail” spot market, which
is a signiﬁcant revenue source for taxicabs in urban
markets but is less important in nonurban markets.
We exploit the sharp difference between diversiﬁed
ﬁrms in urban and nonurban environments to mea-
sure the mediating effect of task differentiation on the
link between diversiﬁcation and outsourcing. Finally,
because diversiﬁed ﬂeets are a relatively simple exam-
ple of the multiproduct ﬁrm, this setting limits unob-
served heterogeneity in outputs, prices, incentives,
and internal organization that might otherwise bias
empirical tests.
Our baseline results show that diversifying ﬁrms
outsource more intensively than ﬁrms that choose to
remain focused. Speciﬁcally, diversifying ﬁrms out-
source an additional 30% of the assets (i.e., taxicabs)
in their legacy business compared to nondiversiﬁers.
Moreover, conditional on diversiﬁcation, the shift
toward owner-operator drivers is less pronounced in
markets where there is more task differentiation. Dou-
bling the population density of a local market leads
to an 11% reduction in outsourcing at a diversiﬁed
ﬁrm, suggesting that interagent costs are the primary
source of scope diseconomies in our empirical setting.
To provide additional context for the statistical
results, we interviewed taxicab ﬂeet managers,
who suggested that although diversiﬁcation creates
substantial efﬁciencies, particularly in dispatching
operations, diversifying ﬁrms faced considerable oper-
ational challenges when combining nonowner taxicab
drivers with a more professional group of limousine
drivers. These problems ranged from driver suspicion
that ﬂeets actively steer better rides to limousines,
to reports of ﬁstﬁghts between taxicab and limou-
sine drivers and incidents of ride “scooping,” where
taxi drivers raced to intercept limousine customers.
Thus, managers of diversiﬁed ﬂeets described a prefer-
ence for contracting with owner-operator taxi drivers,
whose skills and backgrounds more closely match
limousine drivers’ characteristics, making them eas-
ier to manage and a more appropriate source of spare
capacity for the limousine segment. Together with the
statistical evidence, our ﬁeld interviews point toward
social comparison costs as a key driver of scope
diseconomies.
This study makes four main contributions to the lit-
erature on diversiﬁcation and the scope of the ﬁrm.
First, we show that outsourcing is an important orga-
nizational strategy for managing the increased gover-
nance costs associated with diversiﬁcation. Thus, we
connect the literature on the costs of diversiﬁcation
to a literature that emphasizes efﬁcient organizational
adaptation through resource redeployment and asset
divestiture following diversiﬁcation (Capron et al.
1998, Capron et al. 2001).2 Second, we show that
interagent conﬂicts, in general, and social compar-
ison costs, in particular, are an important source
of scope diseconomies, using both qualitative evi-
dence and a novel statistical test for discriminating
between alternative sources of scope induced gover-
nance costs. Third, by linking changes in the hori-
zontal and vertical boundaries of the ﬁrm, we take
a small step toward integrating the literature on
diversiﬁcation as an organizational strategy (Teece
1980, Levinthal and Wu 2010) with organizational
economics’ long-standing emphasis on buyer-supplier
relations (Macher and Richman 2008). By conceiving
of the ﬁrm as a portfolio of transactions or routines,
as in organizational economics, we call attention to
the idea that diseconomies of scope at a speciﬁc point
in the value chain will lead the ﬁrm to adapt orga-
nizationally by outsourcing a particular activity fol-
lowing diversiﬁcation. Finally, our main ﬁndings have
a broader normative interpretation: diseconomies of
scope at the transaction or activity level can make
it difﬁcult to manage parallel divisions with differ-
ent priorities, processes, or incentive schemes, even
(or perhaps especially) when operational and market
similarities create aggregate economies of scope for
the ﬁrm.
2. Diseconomies of Scope,
Diversiﬁcation, and Outsourcing
In this section, we explain why diseconomies of
scope lead ﬁrms to reconsider their vertical bound-
aries following diversiﬁcation. Our theory assumes
that diversiﬁcation is exogenous but rational: ﬁrms
only diversify if they expect synergies to be greater
than incremental costs. However, diversifying ﬁrms
do more than simply combine operations. They also
reorganize to minimize frictions or capture efﬁcien-
cies created by the merger. Although reorganization
might take a variety of forms, our theory emphasizes
outsourcing, or vertical disintegration, as a way to
2 For a review of the literature on the costs of diversiﬁcation, see
Montgomery (1994).
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manage increased governance costs.3 One of our key
messages is that by studying the link between diver-
siﬁcation and outsourcing, we can draw inferences
about the size and nature of scope diseconomies. We
begin by developing this broad idea, before describ-
ing the underlying causes of scope diseconomies and
proposing a set of hypotheses.
Figure 1 provides a stylized illustration of our the-
oretical framework. In the ﬁgure, two vertically inte-
grated ﬁrms merge and subsequently outsource the
activities of one downstream division. Diversiﬁcation
is motivated by upstream economies of scope, whereas
outsourcing alleviates increased governance costs cre-
ated by combining downstream activities. The ﬁgure
highlights several aspects of our theory. First, the unit
of analysis is a group of related transactions or activ-
ities, and the objective is to choose boundaries and
governance mechanisms that maximize total surplus.
Second, we apply the term diseconomies of scope
to any increase in a ﬁrm’s internal governance costs
caused by diversiﬁcation. Thus, diversiﬁcation can
produce diseconomies of scope but still be rational, as
long as it generates even greater synergies elsewhere.
Finally, our framework links scope diseconomies to
both transactions and activities, which are often omit-
ted from studies of diversiﬁcation and vertical integra-
tion, respectively.
The mechanism behind Figure 1 is straightforward.
If diversiﬁcation produces a larger increase in gov-
ernance costs under vertical integration than under
market or contractual governance, then the proba-
bility of outsourcing should increase. Put differently,
diversifying ﬁrms will outsource formerly integrated
activities that produce large negative spillovers across
divisions. This argument is closely related to the
familiar logic of transaction cost analysis. Empirical
tests of transaction cost economics typically assume
that internal governance costs are ﬁxed and look for
a positive correlation between outsourcing and asset
speciﬁcity. We take the opposite approach of assum-
ing the costs of market governance are ﬁxed—or at
least uncorrelated with diversiﬁcation—and interpret-
ing a positive correlation between diversiﬁcation and
outsourcing as evidence of increased internal gov-
ernance costs.4 This idea can be formalized, as we
3 Outsourcing does not imply that payments ﬂow in a particular
direction. For example, a ﬁrm might outsource upstream manufac-
turing operations (in which case it would pay for the inputs) or
a downstream sales force (in which case it would be paid for the
outputs).
4 Assuming that the costs of market or contractual governance are
ﬁxed with respect to a change in scope is different from assuming
that those costs are small. We could also make the weaker (but still
sufﬁcient) assumption that the marginal costs of diversiﬁcation are
larger under vertical integration than under outsourcing; however,
see Gibbons (2005, §3.2) for a critique of this approach.
show in the appendix, using a simpliﬁed version of
Milgrom and Roberts’s (1990) model of complemen-
tarities.5 However, to understand the deeper links
between diversiﬁcation and diseconomies of scope,
we need to unpack the speciﬁc mechanisms that pro-
duce these added costs. The literature on ﬁrm gover-
nance suggests three different explanations for scope
diseconomies: monitoring, rent-seeking, and envy.
Monitoring costs arise from centralized oversight
of divisions and are the main focus of the litera-
ture on diversiﬁcation. We conceptualize monitoring
costs more broadly than simply bureaucratic costs,
which will arise whether divisions are managed jointly
or as separate ﬁrms. In particular, monitoring costs
include the opportunity costs of using a common
set of people and processes to manage a heteroge-
neous portfolio of businesses. Thus, diversiﬁcation
may increase monitoring costs if increased scope exac-
erbates the cognitive or informational constraints on
corporate management. For example, one source of
monitoring costs is managerial distraction, an idea
that dates back at least to Penrose (1959). Her cen-
tral argument is that a corporate manager’s job is
to monitor divisions, a task that grows more difﬁ-
cult with the number, size, and variety of business
units. Because a manager’s cognitive capacity is lim-
ited, increasing the scope or diversity of operations
increases the probability that strategic decisions will
be poorly adapted to the idiosyncratic needs of indi-
vidual business units. Schoar (2002) provides empiri-
cal support for the managerial distraction hypothesis,
ﬁnding that when manufacturing ﬁrms diversify into
new segments the productivity of their existing plants
tends to fall.
Incomplete information can also lead to monitoring
costs. Since the early moral hazard models of Jensen
and Meckling (1976) or Holmstrom (1979), many stud-
ies have examined how a corporate principal might
optimally respond when the agent who runs a divi-
sion takes hidden actions or holds private informa-
tion.6 Solutions range from monitoring to incentive
contracts to delegation and job design. However, a
common thread is that incomplete information makes
5 Diversiﬁcation and outsourcing are complements if the marginal
returns to outsourcing increase with scope. The appendix shows
that the assumption of complementarity is both necessary and suf-
ﬁcient to produce Hypothesis 1. Moreover, when the marginal cost
of diversiﬁcation under market governance is zero, complementar-
ity is formally equivalent to diseconomies of scope.
6 Some authors would draw a conceptual distinction between mon-
itoring costs and problems of moral hazard (hidden action) or
adverse selection (hidden information). We group them to high-
light the shared emphasis on costly information acquisition by
an uninformed principal. Whereas similar informational problems
may be a necessary condition in the envy and inﬂuence cost mod-
els described in this section, those theories place a greater focus on
alternative mechanisms as the main source of governance costs.
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the agency relationship costly to manage. If the sever-
ity of the underlying information problem depends
on the scope of a ﬁrm, then these principal-agent
models yield a theory of scope diseconomies.
A second broad explanation for diseconomies of
scope is that agents in a diversiﬁed ﬁrm waste
resources seeking preferential treatment from the cor-
porate center. For example, Milgrom and Roberts
(1988) conceive of corporate politics as a rent-seeking
process, where division-level agents take actions that
are privately beneﬁcial, but unproductive for the ﬁrm
as a whole. Corporate managers seek policies that
discourage these behaviors (e.g., through budgeting
or transfer pricing), but a CEO’s authority and lack
of commitment power invites lobbying by divisions
who hope to skew the rules of the game. Whereas
the incomplete-information principal-agent problems
previously described are often an important compo-
nent of inﬂuence cost models, we place inﬂuence
costs in a separate category because they empha-
size interdivisional interactions and inefﬁciencies. In
particular, rent-seeking incentives depend on both
monitoring costs and the actions taken by agents in
other divisions.
Rajan et al. (2000) develop an empirical test for
inﬂuence costs in the capital budgeting process.
They ﬁnd that increased diversity, measured as vari-
ation in the asset-weighted Tobin’s q of a ﬁrm’s
divisions, is correlated with inefﬁcient investment
decisions. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms invest more heavily in
divisions with low values of Tobin’s q. Their argu-
ment for indexing inﬂuence costs to diversity draws
on the monitoring cost component of the theory: they
assume that returns to lobbying increase as divisions
grow more heterogeneous, because corporate man-
agers are easier to mislead when they have a less
comprehensive understanding of a division’s opera-
tional activities. Bresnahan et al. (2009) use case study
evidence to argue that inﬂuence seeking by managers
of legacy businesses create scope diseconomies that
hinder large incumbents’ efforts to respond to major
technological change.
Nickerson and Zenger (2008) develop a third theory
of scope diseconomies that emphasizes employees’
taste for fairness, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). They
argue that variance in compensation tends to produce
a group of agents who envy their better-paid peers
and consequently engage in a variety of inefﬁcient
behaviors, including “reduced effort, (engaging in)
inﬂuence activities, departure, noncooperativeness, or
even outright sabotage” (p. 1431). This theory of inter-
agent conﬂict builds upon research in social psychol-
ogy (e.g., Festinger 1954, Adams 1965) that describes
the origins of individual perceptions of inequity and
highlights the importance of endogenous reference
groups. Extending this earlier research, Kulik and
Ambrose (1992) suggest that ﬁrm boundaries are a
natural point of reference for employees, who are
much more sensitive to inequities within a ﬁrm than
between ﬁrms. Furthermore, diversiﬁcation integrates
activities where both pay structures and pay levels are
distinctly different, which provides fodder for envi-
ous feelings. Thus, by combining agents who per-
form similar tasks but have different compensation
systems, incentives and ability levels, diversiﬁcation
can lead to increased envy across divisional lines and
unproductive behavior by disgruntled employees.
We build on theories of monitoring, inﬂuence, and
social comparison costs by linking governance costs
to the scope of the ﬁrm. Our central proposition is
that scope-induced governance costs are larger under
vertical integration than under market or contractual
governance. Speciﬁcally, outsourcing lowers manage-
rial distraction costs by placing operating decisions
in the hands of the (now independent) division, and
reduces monitoring costs by shifting the basis of mon-
itoring from behavioral inputs to contractible out-
puts. Outsourcing also mitigates inﬂuence costs by
placing decision rights in the hands of an indepen-
dent ﬁrm, thereby changing the game of internal
lobbying into an arms-length negotiation. Finally, out-
sourcing shifts the nature of social comparison costs
from within to between ﬁrms. If within-ﬁrm compar-
isons are more salient to agents than comparisons to
a supplier or contractor, then outsourcing activities
performed by agents at the extremes of the incentive
or skill distributions will reduce the overall level of
envy. Thus, by changing the nature of monitoring,
inﬂuence, and social comparison costs, outsourcing
alleviates increased governance costs associated
with diversiﬁcation at the activity or transaction
level.
In summary, when diversiﬁcation increases the costs
of governing a bundle of related transactions inter-
nally, ﬁrms will rethink vertical boundary choices that
were efﬁcient beforehand. Our ﬁrst hypothesis, there-
fore, predicts that when diseconomies of scope lead
to increased managerial distraction, inﬂuence costs, or
envy, ﬁrms will use outsourcing to reduce the overall
costs of governing the diversiﬁed ﬁrm.
Hypothesis 1. In the presence of diseconomies of scope,
horizontal diversiﬁcation leads to vertical outsourcing.
Our second hypothesis examines contrasting pre-
dictions about the mediating effect of task diversity,
or variation in a ﬁrm’s physical or intellectual produc-
tion processes. These competing predictions emerge
from two broad mechanisms, which we refer to as
principal-agent and interagent problems. Principal-
agent problems focus on conﬂicts between employees
at different levels in a formal hierarchy, whereas inter-
agent problems emphasize conﬂicts between peers.
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Principal-agent problems are rooted in the infor-
mational problems and cognitive limitations that pre-
vent a corporate principal from exercising complete
control over division-level agents. The basic principal-
agent problem appears in many theories. For example,
the managerial distraction hypothesis holds that it is
harder to monitor a more heterogeneous portfolio of
businesses, and can be viewed as an effort to explain
the costs of conglomerate diversiﬁcation, which repre-
sents an extreme case of task diversity (Penrose 1959,
Schoar 2002). Monitoring cost theories grounded in
hidden action problems will generate the same pre-
diction if one assumes that increasing task diversity
leads to weaker signals of division-level performance
(Holmstrom 1979, 1982). Similarly, because task diver-
sity places corporate managers at an informational
disadvantage, it may increase division managers’ rent-
seeking incentives in a model of inﬂuence costs. All of
these examples focus on interactions between a corpo-
rate principal and a division-level agent, and stipulate
that a principal’s job grows more difﬁcult as agent-
level task diversity increases.
In practice, managers often rely on information sys-
tems and business processes to address principal-
agent problems and extend their span of control.
However, the efﬁcacy of shared systems and controls
typically declines with task diversity, because stan-
dardized management tools are often poorly suited to
the idiosyncratic needs of individual divisions. Thus,
when diseconomies of scope are caused by principal-
agent problems, the marginal costs of diversiﬁcation
will increase with task diversity, leading to a stronger
link between diversiﬁcation and outsourcing.
Interagent problems arise from conﬂicts between
division-level peers and represent a second broad
source of scope diseconomies. Conﬂicts between
agents are typically rooted in resource congestion
problems or perceived inequities in the distribu-
tion of opportunities and rewards. Because task
similarity leads to increased resource sharing and
greater salience of interdivisional comparisons, inter-
agent conﬂicts are typically more severe when ﬁrms
maintain operationally similar activities in different
divisions.
To illustrate the link between interagent problems
and task diversity, consider the case of envy and
social comparison costs. If fully dissimilar tasks are
rarely viewed as salient references, then increasing
task differentiation should reduce the likelihood that
workers will make interagent comparisons (Kulik and
Ambrose 1992). Nickerson and Zenger (2008, p. 1434)
observe that the saliency of envy increases with “spa-
tial proximity, degree of interaction, and availability
of information” to a reference group, where spatial
proximity is broadly deﬁned to include measures of
social difference and contextualized measures of vari-
ation in ability (Festinger 1954). To the extent that
lower task differentiation increases spatial proxim-
ity by narrowing the range of social differences and
ability levels, while integration increases worker inter-
action and availability of information, social compar-
isons will naturally be more salient among employees
who perform similar tasks within the same ﬁrm.
Thus, for example, we might expect more enmity
between investment and commercial bankers who
both underwrite corporate debt than between a sales
force with strong incentives and the employees of a
manufacturing division.
Well-designed corporate policies (e.g., compensa-
tion, promotion, transfer-pricing, or capital budget-
ing) can mitigate interagent problems. However, these
policies typically have limitations. Firms will be
reluctant to address perceived inequity through a
large pay increase for one group of employees, or
to adjust incentives when there are large differ-
ences in the marginal product of seemingly simi-
lar tasks performed in different divisions. Conﬂicts
over inherently scarce resources, such as top manage-
ment positions, can be very hard to resolve. Thus,
when diseconomies of scope are caused by interagent
problems, task diversity reduces the marginal costs
of diversiﬁcation, leading to a weaker link between
diversiﬁcation and outsourcing.
We have argued that task diversity has different
implications for the governance costs associated with
principal-agent versus interagent problems. Speciﬁ-
cally, if the correlation between diversiﬁcation and
outsourcing is stronger when task differentiation is
high, the evidence suggests that principal-agent prob-
lems are the primary cause of scope diseconomies.
If the link between diversiﬁcation and outsourcing
is stronger when task differentiation is low, the evi-
dence points toward interagent problems. Because the
two mechanisms generate opposing predictions, we
test their relative strength as a pair of competing
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2A. When diseconomies of scope are
caused by principal-agent conﬂicts, the impact of diversiﬁ-
cation on outsourcing will increase with task differentiation.
Hypothesis 2B. When diseconomies of scope are
caused by interagent conﬂicts, the impact of diversiﬁcation
on outsourcing will decrease with task differentiation.
We conclude with a caveat. Our simple story of
diversiﬁcation and outsourcing holds all other aspects
of the ﬁrm’s organization constant. In general, diver-
sifying ﬁrms might adapt their organization in a
variety of ways, and these adaptations could inter-
act in complex ways. For instance, Eccles (1985)
describes how ﬁrms use transfer-pricing policies to
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ration scarce resources, prevent free-riding, and pro-
mote a sense of fairness. Shin and Stulz (1998) study
capital budgeting and coordination. To address inter-
agent conﬂicts, ﬁrms might redesign their promotion
and compensation policies. Rather than work toward
an omnibus theory that predicts when and how much
each component of a ﬁrm’s internal governance struc-
ture will respond to diversiﬁcation, we focus on a
single margin—outsourcing—and seek an appropri-
ate setting to test our hypotheses.
3. Taxicab and Limousine Industry
Our empirical setting is the private-for-hire vehicle
industry, or taxicab and limousine ﬂeets. This indus-
try provides a unique opportunity to study diver-
siﬁcation and outsourcing for several reasons. First,
in response to a wave of deregulation, many taxicab
ﬂeets diversiﬁed into the limousine market during the
early 1990s. We show that a taxicab ﬂeet’s propen-
sity to diversify is linked to concentration levels in
the local limousine market, and we use that variation
in initial market conditions as a source of exogenous
variation in the incentive to diversify. Second, a ubiq-
uitous regulatory requirement that limousine rides be
prearranged produces a clear demarcation between
the two market segments. As a result taxicab and
limousine drivers dress differently, are trained differ-
ently, and are compensated differently even though
they perform very similar tasks. Although the distinc-
tions between taxicab and limousine drivers might
be subtle to passengers, our interviews revealed that
they are deeply signiﬁcant to drivers within the
industry, with compensation differences being a par-
ticularly divisive issue. We argue that task diver-
sity is higher for diversiﬁed ﬂeets in dense urban
markets, where taxicabs earn a greater share of rev-
enue from hails, as opposed to prearranged trips.
Third, because there is relatively little asset speciﬁcity
between drivers and ﬁrms, it is reasonable to assume
that diversiﬁcation does not change the costs of trans-
acting between drivers and ﬂeets through the mar-
ket, but it does alter the cost of organizing the same
relationship through a ﬁrm. This section describes the
industry in greater detail, focusing on the legal factors
that led to a diversiﬁcation wave between 1992 and
1997 and the economic factors that inﬂuence the deci-
sion to diversify into limousines and contract with
owner-operator taxicab drivers.
Taxicab and limousine markets are highly regu-
lated. The number of taxicab licenses granted in a
given market is typically ﬁxed by a local taxicab com-
mission, which provides medallions, or permits, that
are associated with a speciﬁc vehicle. In most mar-
kets, these regulators also set prices and coordinate
regular inspections. Entry into the limousine segment
is considerably more ﬂexible, and restrictions on the
number of vehicles in use are rare. However, whereas
taxicabs can legally accept spot market hails from any
passenger who solicits a ride, all limousine rides must
be prearranged through a centralized dispatcher.
The exclusion of limousines from the hail segment
leads to some important differences in the organi-
zation of taxicab and limousine ﬂeets. For example,
taxicab drivers typically have stronger incentives than
limousine drivers. A study by the Transit Cooperative
Research Program (Gilbert et al. 2002) found that 50%
of limousine drivers are paid a ﬁxed hourly wage and
35% share a large portion of each trip’s revenue with
the ﬁrm, whereas 90% of cab drivers are full resid-
ual claimants; they pay a ﬂat fee to the dispatcher
and keep all of their gross receipts. This arrangement
gives diversiﬁed ﬁrms a strong incentive to allocate
their most lucrative rides to limousines. When ﬁrms
favor limousines over taxicabs, this contributes to a
sense of alienation felt by taxicab drivers (Sheahan
and Smith 2003).
There are two basic types of driver in the taxi-
cab segment: shift drivers and owner operators. Shift
drivers lease cars, permits, and dispatching services
from a ﬂeet. In 1990, 51% of the vehicles in U.S.
taxicab ﬂeets were staffed via day or half-day leases
(Taxicab, Limousine & Paratransit Association 1990).
The same survey suggests that roughly one-third of
the vehicles in U.S. taxicab ﬂeets are leased on a
weekly or monthly basis. Owner operators are drivers
who have purchased a vehicle and medallion, and are
free to choose whether to contract with a ﬂeet for dis-
patching services.
Interestingly, vehicle ownership does little to
change a taxicab driver’s short-term incentive to
locate rides, because both ﬂeet drivers and owner
operators are typically full residual claimants. How-
ever, owning a taxicab and medallion may solve
moral hazard problems or promote long-term invest-
ments to acquire industry-speciﬁc knowledge. Given
the beneﬁts of using owner operators, the level of ﬂeet
ownership in the taxicab segment is at ﬁrst puzzling
(Schneider 2010). However, many shift drivers are
recent immigrants with very few marketable skills,
who would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to ﬁnance a car and medal-
lion, which can cost over $300,000 (Luo 2004).
Before the early 1990s, the taxicab and limousine
segments were kept separate through regulation. This
situation changed in the early 1990s, following a
series of legal challenges to local regulatory author-
ity. One of the most famous examples was the 1993
“Freedom Cab” case (Jones v. Temmer) in Denver,
where a small ﬁrm challenged Colorado’s broad reg-
ulatory authority over entry into the taxicab market
(Cox 1993). Within four years of the Freedom Cab
case, most cities (or states) had deregulated entry into
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the limousine segment. The practical result of these
changes was to remove any legal or political obsta-
cles to cross-ownership, which led to a broad wave
of diversiﬁcation. In our data, 54% of the taxicab
ﬂeets that survived from 1992 to 1997 diversiﬁed into
limousines during that period (see Table 1).
The logic behind diversiﬁcation into the limou-
sine segment is predicated on ﬁxed cost sharing and
cross-selling. Although opportunities for cost sharing
extend to a wide range of activities—from servicing
vehicles to negotiating group rates for insurance—
shared marketing and dispatch operations present the
greatest opportunity. However, our discussions with
ﬂeet managers suggest that conﬂicts over shared dis-
patching also create signiﬁcant organizational chal-
lenges for the ﬁrm. In some cases, taxicab drivers
scoop limousine dispatches by arriving in advance
of the limousine and giving customers the mistaken
impression that their limousine had been cancelled.
Other ﬁrms reported that taxicab drivers had van-
dalized limousines and threatened limousine drivers
during shift changes, accusing limousine drivers of
skimming the best rides. At a minimum, integra-
tion creates confusion among shift drivers over con-
tract terms, engendering ill will between taxicab and
limousine drivers.7
Although the leasing system allows ﬂeets to tap a
large low-skilled labor pool, managing shift drivers,
who are only weakly committed to their job, was
described as a major challenge, particularly in diver-
siﬁed ﬁrms. Shift drivers are often characterized as
having limited knowledge of the city, poor language
skills, and exhibit strong tendencies to engage in
antisocial behavior. Owner operators, by contrast,
are characterized as professionals with an intricate
knowledge of their city, who are ﬂuent English speak-
ers, keep their vehicle clean and in good operating
condition, drive safely, and give the impression that
they take pride in their work.
Our ﬁeld research suggests that outsourcing is
a common organizational strategy to reduce disec-
onomies of scope that arise from social conﬂicts
between taxicab and limousine drivers in a diversi-
ﬁed ﬂeet. Fleet managers invoke the difﬁculty of inte-
grating shift (taxicab) drivers with limousine drivers
as a major reason for contracting with (taxicab)
owner operators. Because owner operators more read-
ily understand the quid pro quo inherent in their
contract with a diversiﬁed ﬂeet, there is a reduced
chance of conﬂict between drivers. Moreover, owner-
operators’ investments in market-speciﬁc knowledge
makes them less reliant on the dispatcher than are
7 Taxicab drivers in diversiﬁed ﬁrms pay lower lease prices because
they receive fewer and less attractive dispatches, but this is often
not well understood by the shift drivers.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
1992 1997
Test sample n= 560 Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
FLEETOWN 0.86 0.33 0.63 0.36
DIVERSIFY 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.50
Taxicab revenue ($000) 675 1,890 849 2,739
Taxicab capital ($000) 230 673 319 934
Total taxicabs 24 64 35 83
Fleets with 2 taxicabs 0.27 0.44 0.09 0.29
Fleets with 3–5 taxicabs 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.42
Fleets with 6–10 taxicabs 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40
Fleets with 11–25 taxicabs 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.40
Fleets with 26–50 taxicabs 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30
Fleets with >50 taxicabs 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.38
Taxicabs in the county 231 480 474 673
Limousines in the county 103 228 221 414
CONCENTRATION 0.05 0.13 0.32 0.36
County population (000) 885 1,036 985 1,147
County square miles 861 1642 878 1,714
URBAN 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48
Partnership 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15
Corporation 0.80 0.40 0.80 0.40
All ﬁrms Total 1992 Total 1997
Taxicab revenue ($M) 521 669
Number of taxicabs 20,014 29,960
Number of ﬂeet owned taxicabs 16,426 18,303
Number of ﬂeets 1,020 1,106
shift drivers and, therefore, less likely to subvert the
dispatching system through scooping. Taken together,
the professionalism and knowledge of owner opera-
tors serves to simplify the dispatching system, which
alleviates some of the managerial problems associated
with an integrated taxicab and limousine business,
particularly interagent conﬂicts that arise due to envi-
ous feelings between taxicab drivers and limousine
drivers.
4. Data and Measurement
We use data from the 1992 and 1997 Economic Census
of Transportation and Warehousing, which includes
every taxicab (SIC 412100) and limousine (SIC 411920)
ﬁrm in the United States with at least one employee.
These data contain establishment-level information
on line of business revenue at the six-digit indus-
try level, number of vehicles by type (taxicab versus
limousine) and geographic identiﬁers. We focus on
taxicab ﬂeets with at least two taxicabs, $10,000 of
taxicab revenue and at least one other taxicab ﬂeet in
their market (county).8 The 1992 and 1997 Economic
Censuses contain 1,020 and 1,106 ﬂeets, respectively,
that meet these criteria.9 Our panel regressions are
8 Alternative samples did not change the results presented below.
9 We discard very small establishments that the Census imputes
values for, rather than surveying directly.
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based on a set of 560 ﬂeets that reported complete
data in both years. Table 1 presents descriptive statis-
tics for these ﬂeets, which account for over 70% of
industry revenue and approximately two-thirds of all
vehicles.
Our dependent variable FLEETOWN is the share
of all taxicabs owned by the ﬂeet, which is equal to
the number of taxicabs owned by the ﬂeet, divided
by the total number of taxicabs operated by the ﬂeet.
Table 1 shows that the mean ﬂeet-ownership rate fell
from 86% in 1992 to 63% in 1997. We measure diver-
siﬁcation using an indicator variable DIVERSIFY that
equals zero for taxicab ﬂeets with no limousines, and
one for taxicab ﬂeets with one or more limousines in
their ﬂeet.10
We use county-level population density as a proxy
for task differentiation between the taxicab and
limousine segments in a diversiﬁed ﬂeet. In dense
urban markets where street-hails account for a sub-
stantial share of all taxi-related revenue, taxicabs
and limousines follow different processes to locate
and service rides. In particular, limousines are only
dispatched to prearranged rides whereas taxicabs fre-
quently locate spot market rides by cruising or queu-
ing in taxicab stands. In less urban markets, where
most rides are dispatched through the same central
switchboard, task differentiation between the taxicab
and limousine segments is low: limousines are essen-
tially taxicabs painted black. We exploit this empirical
regularity to construct two proxies for task differenti-
ation between taxicabs and limousines. First, we use
the log of 1992 county population per square mile
(DENSITY) as a continuous measure of task differ-
entiation. Second, we construct an easy-to-interpret
indicator variable (URBAN) that equals one for ﬂeets
located in counties with population density above
4,000 people per square mile.11
Table 1 shows a large increase in the total num-
ber of taxicabs in our sample between 1992 and 1997.
The increase reﬂects the fact that many formerly inde-
pendent owner operators chose to contract with taxi-
cab ﬂeets during this time period, partly in response
to increased competition following entry deregulation
in the limousine segment.12 Our theory predicts that
these owner operators will seek to join ﬂeets that have
diversiﬁed into the limousine segment because the
match between an owner operator and a diversiﬁed
10 Alternative measures of diversiﬁcation, such as a threshold for
the percentage of total revenue or capital in the limousine segment,
yielded very similar results.
11 This measure of URBAN is based on the average population den-
sity of the 1,000 largest cities (by population) in the United States
during the last quarter of the twentieth century (Kim 2007).
12 Independent drivers are only captured by the Economic Census
when they contract with a ﬂeet.
ﬂeet creates more value than a match to a focused
taxicab ﬁrm. This matching process suggests an impli-
cation of our hypotheses in terms of the evolution of
ﬁrm-level capabilities: ﬂeets that are vertically inte-
grated and focused compete by minimizing capital
investment in vehicles and managing a pool of low-
skill drivers, whereas diversiﬁed and vertically dis-
integrated ﬂeets compete by establishing a brand that
attracts the high-quality rides valued by independent
limousine and taxicab drivers.
5. Empirical Strategy
Our baseline speciﬁcation is a linear regression in
ﬁrst differences. Let i index the ﬂeets in our sample
and  represent the ﬁrst-difference operator (between
1992 and 1997). To test Hypothesis 1, we regress
FLEETOWN on DIVERSIFY and a vector of con-
trol variables X that might inﬂuence ﬁrms’ asset-
ownership decisions, including ﬁrm size measured by
lagged dollar value of a ﬁrm’s capital stock, changes
in local market population, changes in the share of
taxicabs owned by other ﬁrms in the same market;
changes in the number of taxicabs in other ﬁrms in the
market, changes in the number of limousines in other
ﬁrms in the market, a dummy for ﬂeets that register
as a corporation, and a dummy for urban markets.13
Thus, our initial speciﬁcation is
FLEETOWNi = +DIVERSIFYi +Xi+ i (1)
where the parameter  measures the sample aver-
age change in FLEETOWN, and  is the unexplained
portion of any changes in outsourcing. Because we
only observe two time periods, taking ﬁrst differ-
ences is similar to introducing ﬁrm ﬁxed effects,
as either approach controls for unobserved time-
invariant ﬂeet-level factors that might inﬂuence the
level of FLEETOWN.
Whereas (1) controls for correlation between diver-
siﬁcation and time-invariant ﬂeet-level unobservables
that affect outsourcing, one still might be concerned
about selection based on time-varying factors. In
an experimental design, we would randomly assign
diversiﬁcation status and measure ex post differences
in ﬂeet asset ownership across the treatment and
control groups. In practice, we observe changes in
both diversiﬁcation and asset ownership following
a regulatory shift that creates new opportunities for
expansion into related markets. In this setting, we
might expect diversiﬁers to be those ﬂeets that will
beneﬁt most from expanding, which could confound
our estimates. For example, if ﬂeets that experience
a positive productivity shock expand through both
13 Similar results were obtained using models with a full set of legal
form of organization dummies.
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diversiﬁcation into limousines and increased contract-
ing with owner operators, the coefﬁcient on DIVER-
SIFY will be biased.
We address the potential endogeneity of diversiﬁca-
tion by using the lagged concentration of limousines
in a given county (CONCENTRATION) as an instru-
ment for DIVERSIFY. Industry observers suggest that
diversiﬁcation is less attractive when there are strong
limousine incumbents that have already developed
deep relationships in the lucrative corporate segment.
High limousine concentration also represents an entry
barrier because of the increased threat of retaliation.14
Therefore, CONCENTRATION should be uncorrelated
with factors in the error term that inﬂuence taxi-
cab ﬂeets’ outsourcing decisions and negatively corre-
lated with the probability of diversiﬁcation following
deregulation.
To complement our instrumental variables analysis,
we use propensity score methods (Rosenbaum and
Rubin 1983) to control for selection bias. Speciﬁcally,
we estimate a probit model of the decision to diver-
sify and use ﬁtted values from that model as estimates
of the propensity score Prob(DIVERSIFYi = 1 Xi. We
then drop all ﬂeets that do not fall on the common
support of the estimated propensity score distribu-
tion, and we weight the included observations by the
inverse probability of treatment to balance the treat-
ment and control groups (Imbens 2004). Compared to
the standard approach of adding controls to a linear
regression, the propensity score methodology makes
fewer functional form assumptions and eliminates
the inﬂuence of noncomparable control and treatment
group observations that are off the common support
of the estimated propensity score distribution.15
14 Our instrumental variables identiﬁcation strategy would not be
valid if ex ante limousine concentration were correlated with fac-
tors that inﬂuence the relationship between taxicab ﬂeets and
drivers in local markets. However, the cross-sectional correlation
between FLEETOWN and CONCENTRATION was not signiﬁcant
(raw correlation of 0.04), and our informal discussions suggest
that the primary factor limiting entry in the limousine market was
access to a base of corporate customers. Another concern might
be that the timing or nature of deregulation is correlated with
both ex ante limousine concentration and factors that inﬂuence
FLEETOWN. However, our discussions with local regulators sug-
gest that deregulation was often carried out at the state level with
little concern for variation in local market conditions. Finally, a
practical drawback of our instrumental variable is that it only gen-
erates market-level variation; we could not identify any ﬂeet-level
shifters of the costs or beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation that would sat-
isfy the exclusion restriction for an instrument. However, we ﬁnd
that our IV generates substantial between-ﬂeet variation in practice,
because the 560 ﬂeets in our balanced panel operate in hundreds
of different local markets.
15 Intuitively, this approach will outperform standard regression
control methods when the response of FLEETOWN to DIVERSIFY
varies with X (i.e., there is treatment heterogeneity), and X is cor-
related with DIVERSIFY.
Table 2 presents estimates from the probit model
that we use to estimate the propensity score: col-
umn (1) reports coefﬁcients and column (2) reports
marginal effects at the average value of each regressor.
Only ﬁrm size, population density, and limousines
per capita had a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the
diversiﬁcation decision. Columns (3)–(8) in Table 2
compare the sample means of X for diversifying and
nondiversifying ﬂeets, in both the full and matched
samples. Although the percentage of differences are
typically small, they are statistically signiﬁcant for
several variables, and trimming the sample produces
only a modest improvement. This suggests that using
propensity score weights is appropriate; though we
do not expect large changes in the coefﬁcient estimate
on DIVERSIFY given the modest explanatory power
of our ﬁrst stage results.
We test Hypotheses 2A and 2B by adding a proxy
for task differentiation (DENSITY) and the interaction
between DENSITY and DIVERSIFY to our baseline
speciﬁcation (1) yielding




For ease of interpretation and to ensure that our
results are not driven by outliers in the DENSITY dis-
tribution, we also estimate an alternative speciﬁcation
where DENSITY is replaced with the binary measure
URBAN.
The potential endogeneity of DIVERSIFY remains
our key identiﬁcation concern in model (2). Fortu-
nately, our proxies for task differentiation, DENSITY
and URBAN, are exogenous to the dependent vari-
able FLEETOWN, in that they are not choice vari-
ables: ﬁrms choose where to locate before learning
that the possibility of diversiﬁcation exists. Moreover,
the key coefﬁcient in model (2) is based on a triple dif-
ference: 3 measures how the difference in outsourc-
ing between focused and diversiﬁed ﬂeets changes
over time in more or less urban markets. Thus, time-
invariant ﬁrm or market-level factors that might be
correlated with outsourcing are absorbed by ﬁrst dif-
ferencing, and the main effect of density 	2 con-
trols for any difference in outsourcing trends between
urban and nonurban markets from 1992 to 1997. In
principle, we could instrument for the interaction
term by interacting DENSITY with CONCENTRA-
TION, but this approach performed poorly in prac-
tice. Because we fail to reject null hypothesis that
DIVERSIFY is exogenous in model (1), our estimates
of model (2) are based on a simple linear regression.
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Table 2 Probit Model of Diversiﬁcation from Taxicabs to Limousines
Dependent variable: Diversiﬁed from taxicabs to limousines between 1992 and 1997 01
Full sample Common support
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Coef. y/u at u¯ Focus Diversiﬁed t-test on  Focus Diversiﬁed t-test on 
1992 total factor −0	05 −0	02 0	11 −0	00 1	98 0	02 −0	02 0	54
productivity 0	09 0	03 0	05 0	04 0	05 0	04
1992 Fleet taxicab 0	17 0	07 0	89 0	83 1	95 0	88 0	83 1	65
ownership rate 0	22 0	09 0	02 0	02 0	02 0	02
1992 log(taxicab capital) −0	86 −0	34∗ 4	75 3	93 7	42 4	34 3	82 5	25
0	52 0	21 0	09 0	07 0	07 0	06
1992 log(taxicab capital 2 0	02 0	01 9	50 7	86 6	35 8	68 7	64 4	26
0	02 0	01 0	21 0	15 0	20 0	14
Partnership −0	37 −0	15 0	03 0	01 0	56 0	02 0	01 0	36
0	46 0	18 0	02 0	03 0	02 0	02
Corporation 0	20 0	08 0	80 0	81 −0	24 0	79 0	81 −0	64
0	16 0	06 0	03 0	02 0	03 0	02
1992 log(county pop.) 0	11 0	04 12	88 12	86 0	19 12	71 12	84 −1	02
0	11 0	04 0	09 0	09 0	10 0	09
1992 log(county pop.2) 0	00 0	00 6	15 5	73 3	67 6	06 5	71 3	02
0	00 0	00 0	08 0	08 0	09 0	08
log(county miles 2) −0	11 −0	04∗ 3	14 2	85 1	02 3	13 2	87 0	96
0	06 0	02 0	22 0	18 0	21 0	17
1992 log(taxicabs −0	03 −0	01 2	18 1	70 3	55 2	05 1	71 2	29
in the county−i  0	08 0	03 0	10 0	09 0	11 0	10
1992 log(limousines −0	16 −0	06∗∗∗ 0	25 0	34 −2	27 0	23 0	35 −2	83
in the county) 0	06 0	02 0	03 0	03 0	03 0	03
Urban 0	07 0	03 0	43 0	61 −1	41 0	44 0	60 −1	33




N 560 254 306 213 292
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ∗∗signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
6. Results
Figure 2 foreshadows our main result by showing
that there is a strong correlation between DIVERSIFY
and changes in FLEETOWN. Moreover, this correla-
tion does not appear to be driven by heterogeneity in
ﬂeet size, which might be the case if both diversiﬁca-
tion and increased use of owner operators were corre-
lated with unobserved productivity shocks. Figure 3
illustrates our second key result: the link between
diversiﬁcation and changes in FLEETOWN is much
stronger in nonurban markets.
Table 3 presents our baseline regressions, which
show the impact of diversiﬁcation into the limou-
sine market on the asset-ownership mix of a taxicab
ﬂeet. We estimate four different versions of Equa-
tion (1): OLS, ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, propensity score
weighted regression, and the instrumental variables
analysis (2SLS). Column (1) contains the baseline OLS
results. The average change in the ﬂeet vehicle own-
ership rate for diversiﬁers relative to focused incum-
bents is estimated to be negative 31%, and this effect
is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This estimate suggests
that diversiﬁcation accounts for roughly half of the
large secular shift toward driver-owned cabs shown in
Table 1.
Column (2) in Table 3 presents estimates from the
traditional within estimator, in part to show that they
are not substantially different from our preferred ﬁrst-
differences speciﬁcation. In column (3), we report esti-
mates from the propensity score model, which are
indistinguishable from those produced by OLS.16
Because the decision to diversify is endogenous,
the results shown in columns (1)–(3) can only be
interpreted as correlations. In column (4), we present
estimates from our 2SLS instrumental variables
model, which controls for the potential endogene-
ity of DIVERSIFY by using CONCENTRATION as
an instrumental variable. The ﬁrst-stage relation-
ship between limousine-market concentration and
16 We also obtained similar results on changes in limousine owner-
ship in limousine ﬁrms that diversiﬁed into taxicabs.
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1992 asset-ownership rate 1997 asset-ownership rate
Firms that diversify 1992–1997 (n = 305)
Firms that do not diversify 1992–1997 (n = 255)
%%
Total taxicabs
<3 ′3–5 ′5–10 ′10–25 ′25–50 >50
Total taxicabs
diversiﬁcation is strongly negative: the t-statistic on
CONCENTRATION in an OLS regression is −5
4 and
the ﬁrst-stage F -statistic of 11 indicates a power-
ful instrument. In the second stage, the estimated
change in the ﬂeet vehicle ownership rate is nega-
tive 50%, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. We interpret this result as evidence of a causal
relationship between diversiﬁcation and changes in
ﬁrm asset-ownership rates in this industry. Whereas
the 2SLS point estimate is larger than the OLS esti-
mate in column (1), they are not statistically different.
Collectively, the ﬁndings in Table 3 strongly suggest
that ﬁrms outsource to avoid the scope-induced gov-
ernance costs associated with diversiﬁcation.



















1992 asset-ownership rate 1997 asset-ownership rate
% %
Firms that diversify 1992–1997 (n = 305: 101 urban, 204 nonurban)
Firms that do not diversify 1992–1997 (n = 255: 56 urban, 199 nonurban)
Table 4 presents tests of our second hypothesis,
based on Equation (2). We are particularly interested
in the coefﬁcient on the interaction between DIVER-
SIFY and URBAN, our proxy for task differentia-
tion across divisions. Because our dependent variable
is based on ﬂeet ownership, a negative coefﬁcient
would provide evidence of outsourcing in response
to principal-agent problems, whereas a positive coef-
ﬁcient would point toward interagent problems.
Column (1) in Table 4 shows the OLS result, where
task differentiation is measured using the categor-
ical variable URBAN. The main effect of diversiﬁ-
cation continues to be large, negative, and strongly
statistically signiﬁcant, with a point estimate of
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Table 3 Diversiﬁcation and Asset Ownership
Dependent variable: Change in the % of vehicles in
the ﬂeet owned by the ﬁrm (FLEETOWN) a
(2)
(1) Fixed (3) (4)
OLS effects Matched 2SLSb
DIVERSIFY −0	31∗∗∗ −0	40∗∗∗ −0	27∗∗ −0	50∗∗∗
0	07 0	05 0	11 0	09
1992 log(taxicab capital) −0	03 0	21∗∗∗ −0	09∗ −0	05∗
0	02 0	05 0	05 0	03
County taxicab ownership rate−i 0	09∗ 0	08 0	04 0	09∗
0	05 0	06 0	04 0	05
log(taxicabs in the county−i  0	03∗∗ −0	00 0	03 0	03∗∗
0	02 0	02 0	02 0	02
log(limousines in the county−i  −0	02 0	02 −0	03 −0	02
0	02 0	02 0	02 0	02
log(county pop.) −0	13 −0	04 −0	12 −0	13
0	15 0	10 0	19 0	15
Corporation 0	10∗∗ 0	11∗∗ 0	12∗∗
0	05 0	05 0	05




Constant 0	11 34	51∗∗ 0	28 0	29
0	11 16	58 0	21 0	18
560 ﬁrm ﬁxed effects N Y N N
R2/Psuedo-R2 0	12 0	23 0	09 n/a
N 560 1,120 505 560





Note. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market (county) level,
except in the ﬁxed effect model where they are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
aIn the ﬁxed-effects model (column (2)), the dependent variable is
FLEETOWN.
bFirst stage of the 2SLS model: DIVERSIFY i = 
CONCENTRATION i1992+
Xic+ i . The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the
instrument is not necessary at the 1% level (2 = 20 in the 2SLS speciﬁca-
tion, column (4)).
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ∗∗signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.
negative 45%. The point estimate on the interaction
term is large and positive, at 55%, and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% conﬁdence level. Thus, we ﬁnd
that diversifying ﬂeets are more likely to outsource if
they operate in nonurban markets, where task differ-
entiation between taxicabs and limousines is low.
Column (3) in Table 4 replaces the discrete mea-
sure URBAN with the continuous measure DENSITY,
and ﬁnds similar results: doubling population density
leads to an 11% increase in the impact of diversiﬁ-
cation on outsourcing.17 The models in columns (2)
and (4) use propensity score matching to control for
17 The same results were obtained with DENSITY winsorized at the
ﬁrst and ninety-ninth percentile.
Table 4 Diversiﬁcation, Task Differentiation, and Asset Ownership
Dependent variable: Change in the % of vehicles in the
ﬂeet owned by the ﬁrm (FLEETOWN)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Matched OLS Matched
DIVERSIFY −0	45∗∗∗ −0	46∗∗∗ −1	03∗∗∗ −1	11∗∗∗






LOG(1992 POP. DENSITY) 0	03 0	04
LOG(1992 POPULATION −0	03∗ −0	04∗
DENSITY) 0	02 0	02
1992 log(taxicab capital) −0	03 −0	08∗ −0	03 −0	08∗
0	02 0	04 0	02 0	04
County taxicab 0	06 0	07 0	06 0	08∗
ownership rate−i 0	05 0	05 0	05 0	05
log(taxicabs in the county−i  −0	00 −0	00 −0	00 −0	00
0	01 0	02 0	01 0	02
log(limousines in the 0	01 0	02 0	01 0	01
county−i  0	02 0	02 0	02 0	02
log(county pop.) −0	00 −0	00 −0	00 −0	00
0	00 0	01 0	00 0	00
Corporation 0	10∗∗ 0	11∗∗ 0	10∗∗ 0	11∗∗
0	05 0	05 0	05 0	05
Constant −0	14∗∗ −0	14∗∗ 0	04 0	06
0	06 0	05 0	09 0	10
R2 0	18 0	18 0	18 0	18
N 560 505 560 505
Note. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market (county) level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ∗∗signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.
ex ante observable differences between diversiﬁers
and ﬁrms that remain focused. This also has little
effect on the parameter estimates.
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that taxi-
cab ﬂeets outsource in response to interagent prob-
lems that lead to a positive correlation between task
diversity and the marginal costs of diversiﬁcation.18
This ﬁnding is consistent with our qualitative inter-
view evidence, where ﬂeet managers pointed out
the importance of misunderstandings and conﬂicts
between taxicab shift drivers and limousine drivers in
a diversiﬁed ﬁrm.
7. Conclusions
This paper studies the mechanisms behind disec-
onomies of scope by examining how ﬁrms reorga-
nize their vertical boundaries after diversifying. We
show that changes in ﬁrm scope alter the marginal
costs and beneﬁts of vertical integration, leading ﬁrms
18 We also replicated all of the results in this section using a Tobit
speciﬁcation (results are omitted).
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to rethink their vertical boundaries following diver-
siﬁcation. We also investigate the mediating effect of
task diversity on the diversiﬁcation–outsourcing rela-
tionship, using it to discriminate between principal-
agent and interagent drivers of internal governance
costs. A major challenge for empirical work on
these questions is ﬁnding exogenous variation in the
scope of the ﬁrm. To address that challenge, we
exploit a unique opportunity, created by widespread
diversiﬁcation in response to entry deregulations in
the taxicab and limousine industry, between 1992
and 1997.
Supporting our contention that diversiﬁcation leads
to outsourcing in the presence of diseconomies
of scope, we ﬁnd that diversifying taxicab ﬂeets
outsource extensively, deploying 30% more owner-
operator drivers than ﬂeets who continue to focus
only on the taxicab segment. Consistent with the
idea that outsourcing helps alleviate interagent con-
ﬂict, we ﬁnd that the link between diversiﬁcation
and outsourcing is stronger in less urban markets,
where task differentiation between taxicab and limou-
sine drivers is less pronounced. Our interviews with
taxicab ﬂeet managers also suggest that envy-based
interagent conﬂicts are an important source of scope
diseconomies in this industry.
Of course, this study has several limitations.
For instance, we do not measure governance costs
directly. Thus, our interpretation of the link between
diversiﬁcation and outsourcing rests on the assump-
tion that ﬁrm boundaries reﬂect the relative costs of
alternative governance modes. A second limitation
is our emphasis on a single organizational response.
Although vertical boundaries have received a great
deal of scholarly attention, ﬁrms could respond to
diversiﬁcation in a wide variety of ways. Thus, future
research might usefully examine changes in compen-
sation or promotion policies, transfer-pricing arrange-
ments, or capital budgeting processes following a
change in ﬁrm scope.
Despite these limitations, this paper presents new
results, with implications for both corporate strategy
and organizational economics. Whereas other stud-
ies have suggested that diversiﬁcation can increase
governance costs, this observation is rarely recon-
ciled with the idea that ﬁrms make organizational
changes following diversiﬁcation to enhance efﬁ-
ciency. Indeed, the conceptual basis for diseconomies
of scope is often predicated on systematic manage-
rial mistakes. We develop a theoretical framework,
based on efﬁcient adaptation following diversiﬁca-
tion, and present evidence that ﬁrms’ vertical bound-
aries respond to scope induced internal governance
costs. Our ﬁndings also suggest that ﬁrms’ horizon-
tal and vertical boundaries are jointly determined in
a predictable manner (Argyres and Liebeskind 1999).
For example, a vertically integrated manufacturing
ﬁrm might ﬁnd that efﬁcient diversiﬁcation requires
the ﬁrm to outsource legacy raw material produc-
tion processes that no longer “ﬁt” with the diversi-
ﬁed ﬁrm due to increased internal coordination costs
in the procurement function. Thus, future research
on how ﬁrms reorganize following diversiﬁcation
should consider the locus of scope diseconomies, as
our research shows that diseconomies of scope at
a speciﬁc point in the value chain can provide the
impetus for ex post vertical disintegration. Whereas
others have measured interdependencies across ver-
tical supply relationships within a ﬁrm (Novak and
Stern 2007, Forbes and Lederman 2009), we believe
this is the ﬁrst study to provide evidence of a sim-
ilar link between the ﬁrm’s horizontal and vertical
boundaries.
The existence of complementarities between diver-
siﬁcation and outsourcing also has ramiﬁcations for
how scope diseconomies should be analyzed. Perhaps
for analytical convenience, diseconomies of scope are
often modeled as an increasing and convex function
of the number of boundaries or divisions in a ﬁrm.
Although this leads naturally to a simple analysis
of optimal ﬁrm size, it provides little practical guid-
ance in a world where complex interactions among
activities or transactions in different divisions pro-
duce signiﬁcant nonlinearities in the total cost of ﬁrm
governance. Our ﬁndings highlight the importance of
research that unpacks the interrelationships among
divisions as a source of organizational diseconomies
of scope.
Finally, we believe this work has normative impli-
cations for corporate strategy. In particular, we show
that outsourcing is a tool corporate managers can use
to manage increased governance costs that arise due
to diseconomies of scope.
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Appendix. A Model of Diversiﬁcation and
Outsourcing
This appendix develops a simple analytical framework that
illustrates the link between diseconomies of scope, diver-
siﬁcation, and outsourcing. Suppose there are two lines of
business that could be horizontally integrated 	M = 1 or
managed as independent ﬁrms 	M = 0. One line of busi-
ness has a two-stage production process where downstream
activities could be vertically integrated 	N = 1 or out-
sourced 	N = 0. For simplicity, the other line of business is
always integrated, so there are two boundary decisions: one
“vertical” and the other “horizontal.” Joint expected proﬁts
are written as 	MN.
To analyze outsourcing, we deﬁne the net beneﬁts of ver-
tical integration as a function of scope V 	M = 	M1−
	M0, and an exogenous ﬁxed cost ev that is only
incurred under vertical integration. The probability of verti-
cal integration is then PrV 	M> ev, reﬂecting the Coasian
(1937) logic that boundaries are determined by the relative
cost of markets and hierarchies.
To analyze diversiﬁcation, we deﬁne scope economies as
a function of vertical integration X	N=	1N−	0N.
For ﬁxed prices and quantities, X	N > 0 is equivalent to
subadditivity of the cost function: a sufﬁcient condition for
mergers to be efﬁcient (Baumol 1977, Evans and Heckman
1984). If diversiﬁed ﬁrms pay an exogenous ﬁxed cost ex,
the probability of a merger is PrX	M> ex.
Many studies treat diversiﬁcation and outsourcing as
independent decisions. That would be true if both V 	M
and X	N were constant, so changes in ﬁrm scope have no
impact on vertical integration (and vice versa). Figure A.1
illustrates this scenario, where ﬁrms cannot move from hor-
izontally focused and vertically integrated 	M = 0, N = 1 to
diversiﬁed and outsourced (M = 1, N = 0) without chang-
ing both V and X, or (equivalently) ev and ex.
When diversiﬁcation changes the net beneﬁts of verti-
cal integration, we say there are complementarities, deﬁned
as D = X	0 − X	1 = V 	0 − V 	1. When D = 0, both X
and V must be constant, and we are back to the situa-
tion depicted in Figure A.1. When D < 0, diversiﬁcation
lowers the returns to outsourcing. We focus on the case
where D> 0, so the beneﬁts of outsourcing increase follow-
ing diversiﬁcation (perhaps because of increased conﬂicts at
a particular stage of the production process, as discussed in
the text).
When D > 0, there is a straightforward link between
diversiﬁcation and outsourcing. Speciﬁcally, because D> 0
implies that the net beneﬁts of vertical integration are
decreasing in scope, a switch from M = 0 to M = 1 must
lower the probability of vertical integration. Figure A.2
illustrates the choice of ﬁrm boundaries when diversiﬁca-
tion and outsourcing are complements. Note that ﬁrms can
move directly from horizontally focused and vertically inte-
grated (M = 0, N = 1) to diversiﬁed and outsourced (M = 1,
N = 0) by crossing the diagonal line segment. We can use
this cost beneﬁt framework to state a more general version
of Hypothesis 1. Speciﬁcally,
Hypothesis A.1. Diversiﬁcation (increasing M) causes out-
sourcing (decreasing N ) if and only if they are complements
	D > 0.
Figure A.1 Independent Boundaries D = 0
ev
ev = V
ex = X ex
(M = 1, N = 0)
(M = 1, N = 1) (M = 0, N = 1)
(M = 0, N = 0)
Proof. Diversiﬁcation causes outsourcing ⇔ PrN = 0 
M = 1 > PrN = 0  M = 0 ⇔ PrV 	1 < ev > PrV 	0 <
ev ⇔ V 	0 > V 	1, since V 	M is independent of ev ⇔
D> 0. 
To see the relationship between Hypothesis A.1 and dis-
economies of scope, suppose that X	N can be separated
into an upstream piece Xu that does not depend on N , and a
downstream part Xd that does. Further, assume that diversi-
ﬁcation has no impact on (joint) downstream proﬁts unless
there is vertical integration, so that d	00 = d	10 or
equivalently Xd	0= 0. This implies that D=X	0−X	1=
−Xd	1 =d	01−d	11, which will be positive if and
only if diversiﬁcation reduces downstream proﬁts under
vertical integration. We refer to this reduction in expected
proﬁts from merging vertically integrated downstream divi-
sions as diseconomies of scope.
Scope diseconomies are less general than complementar-
ities. In particular, Hypothesis A.1 states that under very
weak assumptions (i.e., boundary choices maximize  our
empirical results imply that diversiﬁcation and outsourc-
ing are complements. To interpret the same results as evi-
dence of scope diseconomies, somewhat stronger assump-
tions are required; speciﬁcally, Xu does not vary with N and
Xd	0= 0. Similar assumptions are standard in the empirical
literature on buyer–supplier relationships,19 and we argue
that they are reasonable in our empirical setting. Moreover,
evidence of complementarities may be interesting in its own
right (Argyres and Liebeskind 1999).
Because D measures diseconomies of scope (the costs
of merging integrated downstream divisions), our second
hypothesis can be stated in terms of cost shifters. Suppose
Z is an index of task diversity. In the text, we argue that
changing Z has different implications for D under different
19 For example, to measure transaction costs, one typically assumes
that asset speciﬁcity changes the costs of contracting without alter-
ing the costs of hierarchy.
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Figure A.2 Complementarities D > 0
ev
ex
(M = 1, N = 0)
(M = 1, N = 1)
(M = 0, N = 1)
(M = 0, N = 0)
theories about the source of scope diseconomies. These pre-
dictions can be summarized as follows:
Hypothesis A.2A. Principal agent problems imply that
D	Z is increasing in Z.
Hypothesis A.2B. Interagent problems imply that D	Z is
decreasing in Z.
Before concluding, we offer two comments. First, Fig-
ures A.1 and A.2 highlight the importance of ﬁnding exoge-
nous variation in M for our empirical tests. In particular,
when the unobserved ex and ev are negatively correlated,
diversiﬁcation and outsourcing will be positively correlated,
even if M and N enter expected proﬁts independently, as in
Figure A.1. Thus, we can only test the hypothesis that D> 0
by ﬁnding some source of variation in M that is uncorre-
lated with these unobserved variables, and asking whether
that variation also leads to a change in outsourcing.
Second, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Athey (1995)
have shown how to generalize this simple cost-beneﬁt
framework to larger systems with many complementary
business practices. Our assumption that D > 0 corresponds
to their concept of super-modularity or increasing differ-
ences in expected proﬁtability. Unfortunately, more com-
plex models can only deliver sharp predictions when all
of the relevant business practices are pair-wise complemen-
tary, so the number of assumptions (or interaction terms in
an empirical setting) grows very large as one moves toward
corporate restructurings that involve many divisions, each
with many vertical stages.
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